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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals has

jurisdiction over this matter

pursuant to Section 78-2(a)-3, Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to

grant relief to Embassy on its unjust enrichment claim where there
was no meeting of the minds as to the terms for the sell of Lot 33?
Standard of Review:

This court reviews the trial court's

findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard of review for
an abuse of discretion.

This court reviews the trial court's

conclusions of law based on those factual findings for correctness,
according it no deference.

Bellon v. Malnarf 808 P.2d 1089, 1092

(Utah 1991).
2.

Did the trial court fail to make adequate findings of fact

on Embassy's claims for relief?
Standard of Review:

Whether the trial court's findings of

fact comply with Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a) and are otherwise adequate and
sufficiently detail for this court to perform its reviewr function
is a question of law which is reviewed £g. novo. Acton v. Deliranr
737 P. 2d 996 (Utah 1987); Rucker v. Dal ton, 598 P. 2d 1336 (Utah
1979).

3. Are the trial court's findings of fact Nos. 7, 11, 13 and
14 clearly erroneous?
Standard of Review:

The trial court's findings of fact will

be set aside if clearly erroneous.
1

A finding of fact is clearly

erroneous if against the great weight of the evidence. Bellonr 808
P.2d at 1091; Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
All statutes cited in this Brief are reproduced

in the

addendum pursuant to Rule 24(f).
STATEMENT OF CASE
1.

Course of Proceedings
This case involves the sale of real property from Appellant

Embassy Group, Inc.'s (Embassy) predecessor in interest, Shim
Investments ("Shim"), a Utah limited partnership, to appellees,
Daryl and Maureen Hatch ("Hatches").

Embassy is the assignee of

all claims against appellees (Tr. 172). In August, 1990 Embassy
commenced this action against the Hatches alleging alternative
claims to recover $40,000.00 owed by the Hatches to Embassy for the
sale of real property, or in the alternative to quiet title to the
property against the Hatches and in favor of Embassy.

(Tr. 1-15).

The case was tried on December 12 and 13, 1991, without a jury
before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby. At the conclusion of the
trial, Judge Cornaby rendered oral findings and conclusions from
the bench and granted judgment in favor of the Hatches, concluding
Embassy was not entitled to recover under any of the claims plead
(Tr. 154-164, R. 301-309).
On January 23, 1992 Embassy filed objections to the Hatches'
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, requesting
numerous modifications and amendments thereto
2

(Tr. 165).

On

January

Cornaby entered judgment against Embassy
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Statement of Facts
In

c.Njily

I'WHI,

Shim,

Embassy's

predecessoi

i

'

interest,

Bountjj-ui# ut;r

totalling

approximate,

*

Redd

Hale

»

qeneral

partnership. The agreed upon value of the property *\*

"16")

The! three lots were subsequently combined into one buildi

] ot known as Bridlewood Subdivision Lot 13 (U, 18-19).
During the summer c" i i ll*P*., .;ip(j<»J I *.»i. I t a i \

\\ rI i

)

expressed to Shim property manager Mark Wahlquist ("Wahlquist") a
dosirr t" | "J? chanr I pi 33 ( K\ 22).

After negotiations' in which

Wahlquist informed Hatch that the value of Lot i i was $ M i uou oo,
Hatch offered to purchase the lot for $80',000.00 (R

23)

Although

offered to purchase 1 ot 3 3 for
only $40,00C

testified that during negotiations; Wat iJ qi list

discussed the sale price of the property at between $100,000.00 and
11 qui st ub1, ' '
*lthough Wahlquist'

3

' approval to sell I ,ot 3 3
uperiors

expressed

some

concern for selling the property for $19,000.00 less than its value
when received from Redd Hale (R. 23, 193).
Subsequently, Hatch informed Wahlquist that his proposed
mortgage lender had specified as a condition for the loan that the
Hatches' building lot be less than one acre in size and cost a
maximum of $40,000.00.

Accordingly, Hatch requested that the

closing documents in connection with the purchase of Lot 33 show a
building lot of less than one acre in size at a purchase price of
$40,000.00 (R. 25-27). To satisfy Hatch's first request, Wahlquist
hired The Consortium, an engineering firm, to lay out a piece of
ground from Lot 33 less than one acre in size on which the Hatches'
home could be built (R. 27). The Consortium prepared, with Hatch's
input, a legal description constituting the building site for the
Hatches' home, describing "A portion of Bridlewood lot 33" with a
total

of

.99928 acres.

Wahlquist

understood

the Consortium

document was to be used by Hatch in connection with obtaining his
loan (R. 27-28; PI. Ex. "1").
To satisfy Hatches' request that the closing documents reflect
a maximum cost of $40,000.00, Wahlquist agreed to a two step
purchase agreement for all of Lot 33 for a total purchase price of
$80,000.00.

The

first

step would

be

$40,000.00

at closing

($20,000.00 down, $20,000.00 on a note) for a portion of Lot 33.
The second step would be the balance of $40,000.00 to be paid
subsequent to the completion of the Hatches' new home on Lot 33 (R.
33-34; PI. Ex. "6").

Hatch did not want a monthly payment schedule

or specific time frame in which to pay the remaining $40,000.00.
4

Rather, Hatch wanted a general coituaitment t h a t I t be paid within a
t wi i y i

M
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1 i ami
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ii !" 1 .

Wahlquist testified that

and Hatch talked at considerable

length about how Hatch was going to ;

second $40,c

Hatch indicated the funds wou
home, and

not from that source, he would have

$4iir

another source

that when
home

.rouble raising

33-35, 6 8 ) .

Hatch testified

his pr: ., :u;nv
he obtained $40,000,00 in equity (R. *-

r

>etween
discussed above
signed

2v

Wahlquist

earnest Money Sales Agreement was prepared and

appellee Maureen Hatch.

The Earnest Money Agreement

if "a portioi I of, Br :i ell eu ::: ;od Si lb,
~n ( I s e e Exhibit "A1111 for a total p u r c h a s e price
Exhibit " A " referred to in the: Earnest Money

; i si oi I I .ot

$40, • 0.00,

The

greement w a s t h e

legal dese i j pi i nil pi np»ii v\i hy Tin.1 consortium dusei i b m q I hi1 "t'l'ViR
acre portior
lot
Ev

JO-^U;

•

* J3 H a t c h presented t o t h e bank a s h :i s - bi ii 1 ding
r±.

jbA. "6" (emphasis added), PI. Ex. "I." and PI.

t

Closing on the sale c
1986

^u a ?

property took place on November 25,
uu.uu

ash down payment

l

closing

:

signed a promissory note :rnr an additional $20, 000
Wahlquist prepared a Warranty Deed transferring all of Bridlewood
(emphasis added)).
Wahlquist had debated with himself whether
33 to Hatch at trie time of closing or only the portion
5

. *

described in the Earnest Money Agreement and The Consortium legal
description.

Wahlquist decided to deed all of the lot to the

Hatches because he felt the remainder of the lot could not be
adequately developed since the severed building portion of Lot 33
blocked access to the remaining portion of the lot.

Further,

Wahlquist trusted the Hatches to pay the remaining $40,000.00 for
the second portion of the lot as they had agreed (R. 45-46).
Wahlquist's trust was, in part, based on the fact that Hatch was a
cousin of Wahlquist7s associate, Grant Bangerter, and Hatch and
Bangerter had carried on discussions regarding family matters in
Wahlquist's office. Because of this, Wahlquist was confident about
deeding all of Lot 33 with the understanding Hatch would pay the
remaining $40,000.00 within two years (R. 34-36).
In approximately

1988, C. D. Larsen was reviewing Shim

transactions for the purpose of preparing tax returns when it was
discovered the Hatches had yet to pay the additional $40,000.00 for
the purchase of Lot 33 (R. 198-199). Subsequently, demand was made
upon Hatch for the remaining $40,000.00 (R. 203-205).

The Hatches

refused to pay the $40,000.00, claiming they agreed to purchase all
of Lot 33 for only $40,000.00.

Accordingly this action was

commenced in August, 1990.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
The evidence presented at trial was conflicting as to the
terms for the sale of Lot 33. Each party had a different belief as
to the lots purchase price.

The documentary evidence was also
6

conflicting. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found
that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties as to
the price for Lot 33.

Since there was no meeting of the minds,

there was no enforceable contract for the sale of Lot 33. However,
the trial court failed to grant relief to Embassy under any of its
claims.
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant
relief to Embassy under its unjust enrichment claim in that the
clear weight of the evidence shows Embassy was entitled to such
relief.

The trial court specifically found that the value of Lot

33 was $80,000.00.

In addition, the trial court found that the

parties failed to agree on the purchase price for Lot 33.

Since

there was no enforceable contract for the sale of Lot 33 and since
Embassy never intended to sell a lot valued at $80,000.00 for
$40,000.00, it would be unjust for the Hatches to retain the
$40,000.00 windfall they received at the expense of Embassy.
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
award Embassy $40,000.00 in restitution damages under its unjust
enrichment claim.
II
The trial court failed to mak- sufficient findings of fact to
support its conclusions denying Embassy relief under any of its
claims for relief.

Embassy asserted five alternative claims for

relief. However, the trial court failed to make specific findings
on each of these claims.

What findings the trial court did make

are insufficient in that they fail to show the trial court's
7

judgment follows logically from and is supported by the evidence.
Rule 52(a) Utah R.Civ.P., and Utah case law requires that specific
findings of fact be made on all material issues and that the
findings of fact be sufficient for this court to perform its review
function.

Otherwise, the trial court's judgment will be vacated

and the case remanded for the entry of sufficient findings of fact.
In light of the trial court's insufficient findings of fact in this
case, this court should vacate the judgment and remand for entry of
proper findings of fact.
III.
The trial court's findings of fact Nos. 7, 11, 13 and 14 are
clearly erroneous in that they are against the clear weight of the
evidence produced at trial. Regarding Findings of Fact Nos. 7 and
14, the documents produced at trial show the erroneousness of the
these findings.

Regarding Findings of Fact Nos. 11 and 13, the

trial record clearly shows that the testimony the trial court based
these findings upon was not given in this case.

Accordingly,

Findings of Fact Nos. 11 and 13 are clearly erroneous.
ARGUMENT
I.
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS
AS TO THE TERMS FOR THE PURCHASE
OF LOT 33# AND EMBASSY IS ENTITLED
TO RESTITUTION DAMAGES
Evidence presented at trial indicated there was never a
meeting of the minds between Wahlquist and Hatch as to the terms
for the sale of Lot 33.

Embassy's counsel argued during closing
8

argument that the evidence showed there was never a meeting of the
minds (R. 284).

And, the trial court concluded in his oral

findings at the conclusion of trial that there was no meeting of
the minds between Wahlquist and Hatch. However, the court provided
no relief for Embassy although the Hatches paid only $40,000.00 for
Lot 33, which the court valued at $80,000.00.

Since there was no

meeting of the minds as to the terms for the sale of Lot 33, there
was no enforceable contract, and the trial court erred in not
awarding Embassy restitution damages to avoid the unjust enrichment
of the Hatches at the expense of Embassy.

A.

There was no enforceable contract for the sale of Lot 33
because there Was No Meeting of the Minds as to the Terms for
its sale
It is a basic principal of contract law that if there is no

meeting of the minds of the parties as to all terms, there is no
enforceable contract.
(Utah 1977).

Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386

f,

[C]ontractual mutual assent requires assent by all

parties to the same thing in the same sense so that their minds
meet as to all terms".

Cessan Fin Corp. v. Meyerr 575 P.2d 1048,

1050 (Utah 1978).
Certainly, in order for there to be a meeting of the minds and
thus an enforceable contract, the parties must have agreed on the
purchase price. For example, in Davis v. Olsonr 746 P.2d 264 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987) this court affirmed the trial court's finding that
there was no meeting of the minds as to the contract price to be

9

paid for the construction of four duplexes and, therefore, no
enforceable contract.
In Davis, as in this case, the trial testimony conflicted
significantly as to the contract price.

Plaintiff testified that

he and defendant Olson orally agreed plaintiff would construct the
four duplexes for cost plus $6,000.00 builder's profit per duplex.
Based upon this oral agreement, plaintiff prepared a cost breakdown
and submitted it to Wasatch Bank for acquisition of long-term
financing and to defendant Olson.

Defendant Olson, on the other

hand, while conceding the price of costs plus $6,000.00 had been
discussed, denied that he agreed to an open-ended deal.
plaintiff

had submitted

After

its cost breakdown to Wasatch Bank,

defendant Olson prepared a written contract with a provision that
costs were not to exceed $72,070.00 per duplex.

Defendant Olson

presented this proposed contract to plaintiff, claiming plaintiff
said that he would sign it. The contract was never executed. Id.
at 266-267.
The Court of Appeals held that given the disparity in the
testimony regarding the contract price, the trial court did not
error in finding that there had never been a meeting of the minds
as to the contract price nor as to the plans and specifications
which formed the basis of the cost breakdown, icl. The court also
approved of the trial court's decision to base recovery on quantum
meruit

in order to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendants.

Id. at 268-270.

10

In the instant case the evidence shows there was no meeting of
the minds between Embassy and the Hatches as to the contract price
for Lot 33.

First, there is ample evidence indicatincj persons

involved with the transaction from Shim honestly believed they were
selling Lot 33 for $80,000.00. Wahlquist testified Hatch offered
to purchase all of Lot 33 for $80,000.00 after he had indicated to
Hatch that the value of the lot was around $99,000.00. Wahlquist
also testified that he never discussed with Hatch the purchase of
all of Lot 33 for $40,000.00 (R. 23, 99).
Wahlquist

obtained

approval

to sell the

Larsen, from whom

lot, recalls giving

approval to sell Lot 33 for $80,000.00 (R. 193). Larsen testified
that he would not have approved the sell of all of Lot 33 for
$40,000.00 in that he believed the value of the property was
$99,000.00, the value given when Shim acquired the property from
Redd Hale (R. 192-194; PI. Ex. "16").
Bangerter, who was a project manager for Shim and who worked
closely with Wahlquist, testified it was his understanding, through
conversations with Wahlquist and Hatch, that the purchase price for
all of Lot 33, was to be $80,000.00 (R. 163, 166, 169-170).
Bangerter#s understanding of the agreement was that Hatch was to
purchase two parcels of ground.
Lot

The first parcel was a portion of

33 which was the building

financing, for $40,000.00.

lot used by Hatch to obtain

The second parcel was the remaining

portion of Lot 33 which was to be purchased by Hatch for an
additional $40,000.00 paid within two years (R. 174, 175).
addition, two witnesses

not associated
11

In

with Shim or Embassy

testified that it was their understanding, through conversations
with Wahlguist in 1986, that he was selling Lot 33 for $80,000.00
(R. 118 -119, 132, 133).
Hatch, on the other hand, testified that he believed he was
purchasing all of Lot 33 for $40,000.00, although he also admitted
Wahlquist had discussed the purchase price at between $100,000.00
and $70,000.00 (R. 228, 243). Hatch also testified he and his wife
wanted to spend only about $30,000.00 for a lot and indicated to
Wahlquist that they wanted to stay in that price range (R. 240,
242). Thus, the trial testimony conflicted significantly as to the
purchase price for Lot 33.
Not only does trial testimony indicate no meeting of the minds
between the parties, but the various documents generated from the
transaction conflict and do not indicate the parties agreed on the
terms for the purchase of Lot 33.

See Oberhanslv vs. Earle. 572

P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977) (Supreme Court upheld trial court's finding
that a binding contract had not been created because the written
agreement was ambiguous and conflicting, indicating no meeting of
the minds between the parties).
On the one hemd, the special Warranty Deed executed by Shim
conveyed all of Lot 33 to the Hatches (PI. Ex. "lO").

The Deed of

Trust executed by Hatch in favor of Shim conveyed all of Lot 33
(PI. Ex. "8").

On the other hand, the Earnest Money Sales

Agreement provides for the sale of only "a portion of Bridlewood
Subdivision Lot 33" for $40,000.00 (PI. Ex. "6").

In addition, the

legal description prepared by The Consortium which was to be used
12

by Hatch to secure financing, and was to be attached to the Earnest
Money Agreement as Exhibit "A" is entitled "A portion of Lot 33
amended Bridlewood Subdivision Phase II more particularly described
as follows", and describes a .9992 acre portion of property from
Lot 33 (PI. Ex. "1" and "4").
The Hatches claim the Trust Deed and Warranty Deed support
their claim that the contract price for all of Lot

33 was

$40,000.00. However, the Earnest Money Sales Agreement is clearly
inconsistent with the Hatches' understanding since it evidences a
contract for the sale of only a portion of Lot 33 for $40,000.00.
In addition, the Earnest Money Sales Agreement is consistent with
Wahlquist's testimony that the parties agreed that only a portion
of Lot 33 would be sold for $40,000.00.

This is also consistent

with Wahlquist's understanding that the deeding of all of Lot 33 to
the Hatches did not relieve them of their obligation to pay an
additional

$40,000.00

for

the

remaining

portion

of

Lot 33.

Similarly, the legal description prepared by The Consortium,
as well as the circumstances surrounding

its preparation, is

consistent with Wahlquist's understanding that the purchase price
for Lot 33 was $80,000.00.

Testimony at trial indicated that The

Consortium was hired to survey a portion of Lot 33 less than one
acre in size on which the Hatches' home could be built.

This was

done to satisfy Hatches' mortgage lender who was requiring a
building lot of less than one acre at a maximum cost of $40,000.00
(R. 25-28).
hired

to

There is no reason for The Consortium to have been

prepare

the

legal

description
13

other

than

if

the

transaction for the sale of Lot 33 had been as Mr. Wahlquist
testified.

That is, a purchase of a portion of Lot 33 for

$40,000.00# and a second purchase for the remaining portion of Lot
33 for another $40,000.00.
Thus, the written documents generated from this transaction as
well as the testimony conflict and do not indicate a meeting of the
minds between the parties. If both parties sincerely and honestly
believe

the

terms

of

the

contract

where

as

each

of

their

testimonies indicated, then there was no meeting of the minds and
thus no valid enforceable contract.
In his oral ruling from the bench, which the trial court filed
as part of the transcript, the court stated that both Wahlquist and
Hatch appeared honest in their belief that the terms of the
transaction for the sale of Lot 33 were as each testified.1

The

court stated:
I found Mr. Wahlquist to be a credible
witness. I found Daryl Hatch to be a credible
witness.
I recognize their opinions are
diametrically opposed.
I asked myself the
question: Is one of them lying? Which is
always a possibility, and that still is a
possibility. If it is, I don't know because
they appeared to be honest.
What other answer is there? And, of course,
counsel for the plaintiff cited one of those
possibilities, and that it#s a mutual mistake
x

Hanson v. Hanson. 736 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah Crt. App. 1987)
(Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) explicitly authorizes this court to look
beyond the written Findings of Fact to the trial record and
evaluate the sufficiency of the judge's oral findings). See also
Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neely Const. Co.r 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah
1984) (where, as in this case, see Argument 2, written findings are
incomplete, inadequate or ambiguous, the court may look to the
trial court's oral decision).
14

of the parties.
That all this time the
plaintiff was expecting a two-step method, and
the defendant was saying, 'Boy, I've got a
real bargain on this property. They finally
came down to $40,000.00 because that's what
they're going to sign all of the contracts
for.' And so he proceeds on it.
When I find that both of the parties have
appeared to be honest, when I say both
parties, I'm talking about Mr. Wahlquist and
Mr. Hatch, it probably puts me in the belief
that we're probably talking about a mutual
mistake more than we're talking about a
contract to pay the $80,000.00.
(R. 307-308; Tr. 161-162).2
It is clear the trial court, after considering the significant
and conflicting testimony and evidence at trial, concluded there
was no meeting of the minds between the parties as to the contract
price for all of Lot 33. Each party honestly believed a different
sales price had been agreed upon and went

forward with the

transaction when in fact no agreement had been reached.

Having

made the finding that there was no meeting of the minds, the court
abused its discretion in not awarding restitution damages to avoid
the Hatches' unjust enrichment at the expense of Embassy.

2

In the portion of Judge Cornaby's ruling quoted above, he
uses the term "mutual mistake" to describe what is clearly no
meeting of the minds rather than "mutual mistake" in the legal
sense. "Mutual mistake" in the legal sense presupposes the parties
had the same understanding of a fact or matter about which both
parties are mistaken. See e.g. Robert Linkston, Ltd v. McOuarrier
741 P.2d 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maybey v. Kav Peterson Const.
Co.. 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984).
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B.

Trial Court Erred in Not Awarding Restitution Damages Under
Embassy's Unjust Enrichment Claim
Since both parties in this case had an honest, but differing,

understanding as to the purchase price for all of Lot 33, there was
no meeting of the minds and no enforceable contract. Since Embassy
transferred all of Lot 33, valued at $80,000.00, to the Hatches,
and received only $40,000.00, the trial court erred in not awarding
restitution damages under the theory of unjust enrichment.
As is discussed in Argument II, the trial court failed to make
adequate, specific findings of fact on Embassy's unjust enrichment
claim to enable Embassy to argue the erroneousness of such findings
on appeal. Also, because of the lack of specific findings, it is
difficult to determine upon what evidence the trial court based its
conclusion of law that "the evidence adduced at trial does not
support the plaintiff's claim for recovery under the theory of lack
of consideration and unjust enrichment" (Tr. 175). Nevertheless,
had the trial court made a finding of fact on Embassy's unjust
enrichment claim that denied Embassy recovery, it would have been
clearly erroneous in that it would be against the clear weight of
the evidence produced at trial relevant to the elements of unjust
enrichment. Spytfrerp Title gufrr- QQ. yf Pqther?, 761 P.2d 951, 954
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Unjust enrichment, also known as quasi contract, is one branch
of quantum

mernit

and is a legal action in restitution Davis v.

Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
of

Appeals

held

that the

trial
16

court

In Davis, the Court

correctly

found

that

plaintiff's recovery must be based on quantum

meruit

to avoid

unjust enrichment where the court found that no express contract
existed since there was no meeting of the minds between the
parties.
The elements of unjust enrichment are:

(1)

the defendant

received the benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the
defendant of the benefit; and (3) under circumstances that would
make it unjust ror the defendant to retain the benefit without
paying for it. Barrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984).
The measure of recovery under unjust enrichment is the value of the
benefit conferred

en the defendant, or the defendant's gain.

Do\is, 746 P.2d at 269.
Regarding the first element of unjust enrichment, there is no
evidence disputing that defendant was conveyed all of Lot 33, both
the .9992 acre building lot described in PI. Ex. "1", and the
remaining

portion

of the

lot,

for a total

of

1.722

acres.

Likewise, the evidence clearly establishes that element two,
defendant's knowledge of a benefit, is satisfied (R. 227-228).
The third element of unjust enrichment is that the defendant
receive a benefit "under circumstances that would make it unjust
for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it."
Davisf 746 P.2d at 269. This element is satisfied in this case.
First, the trial court specifically found that the value of
Lot 33 was $80,000.00 (R. 305; Tr. 174). Two experts experienced
in valuing real estate in the Bountiful foothills area where Lot 33
is located testified that they were familiar with the lot and that
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its value was between $75,000.00 and $90,000.00 (R. 118, 131-134).
In addition, it was established that at the time Embassy obtained
the property from Redd Hale, it was valued at $99,000.00 (PI. Ex.
"16").

Hatch, on the other hand, introduced no evidence that the

value of Lot 33 differed in any significant amount from the value
Embassy's experts placed on the property.

Thus, the Hatches

received

property

approximately

two

acres

of

prime

with an

unrestricted view of the Great Salt Lake valued at about $80,000.00
for only $40,000.00.
Because there was no meeting of the minds and no enforceable
contract for the sale of all of Lot 33 for only $40,000.00, it
would be unjust to allow the Hatches to retain the $40,000.00 value
they received without paying for it.

Embassy had no intention of

selling the $80,000.00 lot for $40,000.00.

Wahlquist, Bangerter

and Larsen testified that it was their understanding that the sale
price for the lot was $80,000.00 and that approval would not have
been given to sell all of the lot for only $40,000.00 (R. 23, 163171, 193).

To allow the Hatches to retain the $40,000.00 would

unjustly enriched the Hatches at a $40,000.00 expense to Embassy.
Although it is very difficult to glean the trial court's
reasoning and the basis of his decision from his oral findings, the
oral findings nevertheless suggest the trial court might have been
reluctant to grant relief under unjust enrichment because a home
had been built on Lot 33 and a $200,000.00 loan obtained.
court stated:
It's been suggested to the court that I might
try reformation
of contract or unjust
18

As the

enrichment.
I said I don't believe it's
fraud. I just don't see where any of these
solve the problem that the court's faced with.
If there was a mutual mistake of fact, one
thinking it was $80,000.00, the other thinking
it was $40,000.00 the court, had there not
been a house built on it, had there not been a
$200,000.00 loan on it, it might be easy for
the court to talk about reformation of
contract or a rescission of the contract. But
I can't talk in those terms.
(R. 308; Tr. 162).

The above quote indicates the trial court

concluded that rescission or reformation of contract is the type of
relief that must be granted in an unjust enrichment claim and that
both would be impractical or unjust in this case because a home had
been built on the property and the Hatches had obtained a large
loan. Although the court's rationale or reasoning is certainly not
clear, what is clear is that under an unjust enrichment claim the
measure of recovery is the value of the benefit conferred upon the
defendant not reformation or rescission.

Davis, 746 P.2d at 269.

The evidence clearly shows that the value of the benefit conferred
upon the Hatches was $40,000.00. A monetary judgment in favor of
Embassy in that amount would not have impaired the market value of
the home or property, and would not interfer with the Hatches'
financing.

Such an award would only require the Hatches to pay

fair value for what they received.

Accordingly, the trial court

abused its discretion in not granting Embassy such relief under its
unjust enrichment claim.
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ARGUMENT
II.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE SUFFICIENT
FINDINGS OF FACT TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSIONS DENYING EMBASSY RELIEF
Rule 52(a), Utah R.Civ.P., requires a trial court sitting
without a jury to make specific findings of fact and state
separately its conclusions of law based thereon.3
requirement is mandatory and may not be waived.

Rule 52(a)'s

Romrell v. Zions

Nat. Bank. N.A.. 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980). The court's Findings of
Fact must show that the court's judgment "follows logically from,
and is supported by, the evidence." Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423,
426 (Utah 1986).

As stated in Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P. 2d 1336,

1338 (Utah 1979):
The importance of complete, accurate and
consistent findings of fact in a case tried by
a judge is essential to the resolution of
dispute under the proper rule of law. To that
end, the findings should be sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached.
The failure of the trial court to make adequate findings of fact is
reversible error unless the facts in the record are "'clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor
of the judgment.'"

Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah

1987)(quoting Kinkella v. Bauah, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)).

3

Rule 52(a) reads in relevant part: in all actions tried upon
the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions of
law thereon . . . . Utah R.Civ.P. 52.
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Embassy

asserted several alternative claims for recovery

including breach of contract, reformation of contract, fraud,
mutual mistake, lack of consideration and unjust enrichment (Tr. l15).

Testimony was taken and evidence introduced during one and a

half days of trial.

At the conclusion of trial, the trial court

entered conclusions of law which denied Embassy recovery on all
claims plead.

The conclusions of law read:

1. That this court has jurisdiction to decide
the disputed claims between the parties.
2. That the evidence adduced at trial does
not support the plaintiff's claim for recovery
under the theory of breach of contract or
reformation of contract.
3. That the evidence adduced at trial does
not support the plaintiff's claim for recovery
under the theory of fraud.
4. That the evidence adduced at trial does
not support the plaintiff's claim for recovery
under the theory of mutual mistake.
5. That the evidence adduced at trial does
not support the plaint if's claim for recovery
under the theory of lL.k of consideration and
unjust enrichment.
6. That the evidence adduced at trial
requires that title and ownership of Lot 33
Bridlewood Subdivision Amended be quieted such
that legal and equitable title vest solely to
T. Daryl and Maureen Hatch . . .
* * * *

(Tr. 175-176). The trial court failed to make findings of fact to
support its conclusion that Embassy was not entitled to recover
under any of its claims.

The court's findings of fact read as

follows:
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1. Plaintiff, Embassy Group, Inc. is a Utah
corporation, the beneficiary of an assignment
of interest in any claim that Grenada, Inc.
and/or Shim Investments may have had against
Defendants for the purchase of Lot 33 of the
Bridlewood Subdivision, located in the City of
Bountiful, Davis County, State of Utah.
2. Defendants T. Daryl Hatch and Maureen
Hatch are residents of Davis County, State of
Utah.
3. The dispute herein involves real property
located in Davis County and involves a
controversy which is in excess of $10,000.00.
4. This court has jurisdiction to hear the
matter.
5. The Plaintiff's agents testified that they
believed very positively that Lot 33 of the
Bridlewood Subdivision was to have been sold
to the Hatch's [sic] for $80,000.00.
6.
Defendant
also
testified
very
affirmatively that he only agreed to pay
$40,000.00 for Lot 33, and in fact that he
could only afford a building lot priced at
$40,000.00 or less.
7.
All
of
the
written
documentation
concerning the sale of Lot 33 to the
Defendants indicates that the purchase price
was $40,000.00.
8. The Court finds no distinction between the
wording of the first Earnest Money Agreement
dated September 12, 1986, which reads 'a
portion of Lot 33 Bridlewood Subdivision' for
$40,000.00, and the subsequent Earnest Money
Agreement of the same date which reads 'a
portion of Bridlewood Subdivision Lot 33' for
$40,000.00.
9. The Court is persuaded that there is no
reason why Plaintiff or its predecessor could
not have divided Lot 33 by utilizing a 'flag
lot.'
10. The Court further finds no reason why Lot
33 could not have been divided into three
lots, assuming the necessary additional
22

improvements
were
made
approvals were obtained.

and

appropriate

11. The Court also found Defendant Maureen
Hatch to be a credible and reliable witness,
particularly when she testified that it was
her understanding that the cost of Lot 33 was
$40,000.00.
12. The Court finds that the evidence is not
clear as to the why Maureen Hatch's signature
is the only one which appears on the Earnest
Money Agreement.
13. The Court is convinced that if Defendant
Daryl Hatch believed he was buying Lot 33 for
$80,000.00, he would not have told his wife he
was buying it for $40,000.00.
14. The Earnest Money Agreement and all of
the loan and closing documents prepared by the
Plaintiffs indicate that the purchase price of
Lot 33 was $40,000.00.
15. The Court is convinced that if in fact
both parties had agreed that the purchase
price of Lot 33 was to have been $80,000.00,
they would also had to have been involved in a
scheme to deceive the bank for the Hatches'
the [sic] long term financing. If that were
the case, the Plaintiff would be before the
Court with 'unclean hands.'
16. The Court finds that the Plaintiff could
have sold the front portion of Lot 33 for
$40,000.00 to the Hatches, and reserved
ownership of the rear portion of Lot 33 for an
additional $40,000.00, but chose not to do so.
17. The evidence presented at tria? indicates
that Lot 33 likely had a value of $80,000.00
at the time of the sale to the Hatches;
although, there is some question as to whether
Lot 33 could have been divided into three lots
which would have sold for $33,000.00 each.
18. The evidence supports the fact that at
the time the Hatches bought Lot 33, the
Bridlewood Subdivision was incomplete.
The
evidence indicates that it would have cost
between $8,000-10,000 per lot to make the
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necessary improvements to divide Lot 33 into
three separate lots.
19. The
Court
finds
that
Plaintiff's
predecessor may have been motivated to sell
Lot 33 for $40,000.00 as a result of its
pending bankruptcy and financial difficulties.
20. Plaintiff is required to meet the burden
of proof, which in this case is by "clear and
convincing" evidence.
21. The Court finds that Plaintiff has not
met its burden of proof.
(Tr. 172-174; see also Addendum "B")
The trial court failed to make findings of fact on each of
Embassy's claims. The trial court's factual findings are merely a
list of factual conclusions and do not show how they relate, or
their relevance, to the claims raised by Embassy.
Findings

of

Fact

disclose

the

steps

by

which

Nor, do the
the

ultimate

conclusions on each of Embassy's claims was reached as required in
order for this court to perform its review function.
Smith, 726 P. 2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986).

Smith v.

In addition, the lack of

findings of fact on each of Embassy's claims puts Embassy in a
difficult position. That is, Embassy has no specific factual
findings on its claims to argue are clearly erroneous.
The trial court also failed make to adequate findings in his
oral ruling from the bench

(see Addendum

"A").

Mention of

Embassy's different claims is interspersed in the ruling, but
without a clear enunciation of the findings on the particular
claims.

It is difficult to determine when the trial court begins

to address a particular claim and when he concludes his findings on
that claim and begins discussing another.
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The court's oral ruling

does not

show that his conclusions

follow

locally

from the

evidence. Nor, does the ruling reveal the steps by which the trial
court reached his conclusions. For example, the trial court makes
several

findings which are clearly

inconsistent with denying

Embassy recovery under one or more of its claims. Yet, there is no
explanation nor resolution of the inconsistent findings.

For

example, the trial court found that the value of Lot 33 was
$80,000.00, rather than the $40,000.00 paid by the Hatches (R. 305;
Tr. 159). The court found that both parties were truthful in their
testimony as to the understanding of the terms for the sale of Lot
33 (R. 307, 308; Tr.161, 162). The court also acknowledged that
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement reflected a contract for the sale
of only a portion of Lot 33 for $40,000.00 (R. 302-303; Tr. 156157).

These findings indicate Embassy is entitled to recovery

under its unjust enrichment claim.

However, having made these

findings, the court failed to explain why Embassy was not entitled
to any relief under its unjust enrichment claim, or any of its
claims for that matter.
As discussed above, the trial court's failure to make adequate
findings of fact which show that its conclusions denying Embassy
recovery follows logically from and is supported by the evidence,
and where the findings of fact fail to detail and disclose the
steps by which the trial court reached its conclusion on each of
the factual claims raised, the trial court's judgment should be
vacated and the case remanded unless the facts in the record are
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in
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favor of the judcpnent."

Acton, 737 P.2d at 999.

As is shown

throughout this brief (see Arguments I and III),

the evidence

presented at trial is not uncontroverted and capable of supporting
only a finding in favor of the Hatches.

Accordingly, the trial

court's judgment should be vacated and this case remanded for the
entry of proper findings of fact.
III.
SEVERAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF
FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
Although the trial court failed to make findings of fact on
each of Embassy's claims which adequately support the trial court's
conclusions, the court nevertheless entered twenty-one written
findings of fact.

Four of these findings of fact are clearly

erroneous in that they are against the clear weight of evidence
produced at trial. Southern Title Guar. Co. vs. Bethers, 761 P.2d
951 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The trial court's written finding of fact No. 7 reads:
7.
All of the written documentation
concerning the sell of Lot 3 3 to the
defendants indicates that the purchase
price was $40,000.00.
(Tr. 172).
This

finding

is clearly

erroneous.

"All" of the documents

concerning the sale of Lot 33 do not indicate that the purchase
price for Lot 33 was $40,000.00. As has been discussed throughout
the brief, the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, Exhibit "6", clearly
shows that the parties agreed that only a portion of Lot 33 would
be sold for $40,000.00 (PI. Ex. "6").
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Also, Exhibit "5", another

Earnest Money generated from the transaction, but never signed,
provides that only a portion of Lot 33 would be sold for $40,000.00
(PI. Ex. "5").
There are no documents which show the sale price for Lot 33 at
$40,000.00. The Warranty Deed which conveyed all of Lot 33 to the
Hatches contains no sale price. Likewise, the Trust Deed Note and
accompanying Trust Deed do not shr w that the purchase price for Lot
33 was $40,000.00.

The note and 3eed only show that the Hatches

executed a Deed of Trust to all of Lot 33 in favor of Shim to
secure repayment on the Trust Deed Note. Nowhere in the note is it
indicated that the total purchase price for Lot 33 was $40,000.00.
Accordingly, the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 7 is clearly
erroneous in that (1) the Earnest Money Sales Agreement certainly
proves that not "all" documents concerning the sale of Lot 33
indicates the purchase price of $40,000.00; and (2) there is, in
fact, no document showing the sale price for Lot 33 at $40,000.00.
Similarly, the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 14 is clearly
erroneous.

Finding of Fact No. 14 reads:

14. The Earnest Money Agreement and all of
the loan and closing documents prepared by the
Plaintiffs indicate that the purchase price of
Lot 33 was $40,000.00.
(Tr. 173).
Again, the Earnest Money Sales Agreements, PI. Ex. "5" and
"6",

do not

indicate

the

total

sale

price

for Lot

33 was

$40,000.00. Both documents provide for the sale of only a portion
of Lot 33 for $40,000.00.

That portion was described as .9992

acres in the Consortium documents (PI. Ex. "1" and "4").
27

In

addition, the loan and closing documents do not indicate that the
purchase price

for Lot

33 was

$40,000.00.

The Purchaser's

Statement and Seller's Statement, defendants' Exhibit "1" and
plaintiff's Exhibit "7" respectively, indicate the purchase price
of $40,000.00 for a street address, not Lot 33. Nowhere in either
document is there an indication that the total purchase price for
Lot 33 was $40,000.00. Nor do the loan documents which Finding No.
14 purportedly refers to indicate a purchase price for Lot 33 at
$40,000.00 (D. Ex. Exhibit "4" and "3").

The documents simply

indicate Shim was to receive $20,000.00 from the Hatches' loan from
First Security Bank and authorized

the disbursement

of that

$20,000.00. Accordingly, the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 14
is clearly erroneous because neither the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement nor loan and closing documents indicate the purchase
price for Lot 33 was $40,000.00.
The trial court's Finding of Fact No. 11 is clearly erroneous.
Finding of Fact No. 11 reads:
11. The Court also found Defendant Maureen
Hatch to be a credible and reliable witness,
particularly when she testified that it was
her understanding that the cost of Lot 33 was
$40,000.00.
(Tr. 173).
Maureen Hatch's trial testimony appears at page 155 of the
record and continues through page 159.

At no time during her

testimony did Maureen Hatch testify it was her understanding the
cost of Lot 33 was $40,000.00. Since Maureen Hatch never testified
that it was her understanding
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that the cost of Lot 3 3 was

$40,000.00, such a finding that she did so testify is clearly
erroneous.
The trial court's Finding of Fact No. 13 is clearly erroneous.
Finding of Fact No. 13 reads:
13. The Court is convinced that if Defendant
Daryl Hatch believed he was buying Lot 33 for
$80,000.00, he would not have told his wife he
was buying it for $40,000.00.
(Tr. 173).
Daryl Hatch's trial testimony appears at page 227 of the
record and runs through page 263.

Embassy's counsel has reviewed

this trial testimony carefully and at no point during Mr. Hatch's
testimony did he testify that he told his wife he was buying Lot 3 3
for $40,000.00.

Nor, was there any other testimony at trial

indicating Mr. Hatch told his wife he was buying Lot 33 for
$40,000.00.

Since there is no testimony indicating Daryl Hatch

told his wife he was buying Lot 33 for $40,000.00, the finding of
fact that Mr. Hatch did tell his wife he was buying the lot for
$40,000 is clearly erroneous.
As the above arguments indicate, the trial court's Findings of
Fact Nos. 7, 11, 13, and 14 are clearly erroneous in that they are
against

the

clear

weight

of

evidence

produced

at

trial.

Accordingly, this court should consider the erroneousness of the
findings in any attempts this court may make to determine the basis
for the trial court's ruling denying Embassy recovery on each and
all of its claims.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Embassy respectfully
requests this court reverse the trial court and enter judgment in
favor of Embassy and against the Hatches for $40,000.00•

In the

alternative, Embassy respectfully requests this court to remand
this case to the trial court for specific and adequate findings of
fact on all of Embassy's claims.
DATED this

^

day of October, 1992.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

HEINZ~J. MAHLER
KIRK G. GIBBS
Attornesy for Plaintiff
Embassy Group, Inc.
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FARMINGTON, UTAH, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 1 3 ,

1991

* * * * *

Now, the Court will make the following findings and
decision in this matter:
First, that the plaintiff is a corporation, that
its agents have been very positive in testifying that the lot
was to be sold for $80,000.

Defendant has just been as

—

just as positive.
When I use "the defendant," I'm going to talk about
Daryl Hatch as opposed to his wife.

I do that because

Maureen Hatch apparently had very, very little to do with
this transaction or any conversations having to do with it.
But the defendant indicated that he couldn't afford
a lot in excess of $40,000.

In fact, he was looking for a

lot in the $30,000 area and hopefully even lower than that.
Plaintiff's agents are positive that the defendant
is lying.

And, of course, one of the prime issues this Court

has to decide is whether or not Daryl Hatch is lying.

The

Court listened to him carefully, and I can't say that he's
lying.

All of the written documents show that the sale price

was $40,000.

From one point of view, that's pretty

persuasive.
I am, of course, aware that Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1 —

I can't conceive of it having been created for

any reason other than a two-step payment as the parties have

nffrlhi ^Bstoum cJfick&n Court Reporter

2

i

I testified to.

I recognize that Defendant's Exhibit

—

2

Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, which is the earnest money agreement

3

signed by Mr. Wahlquist dated September 5th, 1986, said "a

4

portion of Lot 33" for $40,000.

5

Exhibit 6, which had Maureen Hatch's signature on it said "a

6

portion of Bridalwood Subdivision, Lot 33" for $40,000.

7

don't think the wording of those makes any difference to the

8

Court.

9

expression of that it was a portion of a lot for $40,000.

10

I'm aware that Plaintiff's

I

I think both was saying the same thing so far as the

The Court's been persuaded or recognizes that

11

there's no reason why the plaintiff could not have severed

12

the flag lot into a separate lot had it chosen to do so.

13

aware in saying that that Mr. Wahlquist testified that to do

14

so would make it worthless.

15

would be so.

16

showing Lot 33.

17

I don't recall which document was brought in and a line was

18

drawn across showing what the original three lots were.

19

nothing had changed to make that flag lot severed worth less

20

than the 40,000 that was testified to by one of the experts

21

that he thought that flag lot was worth,

22

All of the conditions were still there, so the flag lot could

23

have been sold as a flag lot and nothing had changed as far

24
25

I'm

The Court can't see why that

The line was drawn across a portion of the plat
I'm looking at Plaintiff's Exhibit 17.

it could have

And

But

—

I as I can tell.
Now, just a word or two about Maureen Hatch.

xovjti cHicKLn Court Reporter

As I

said, she knew little about it.

It was certainly her opinion

that it was a sale for $40,000.

She appeared to be an honest

witness before the Court.

She doesn't remember why she was

the one that signed the earnest money agreement.

Defendant

Daryl doesn't seem to remember why she was the one who signed
it. Mr. Wahlquist doesn't seem to remember why it was that
she signed it.

It's obvious she did sign it, however.

But I can't understand if it had been a sale in the
defendant's mind for $80,000 why he would not have conveyed
that information to his wife Maureen, why he would have let
her believe that it was only 40,000.

Sometime that would

have had to have been a difficult thing to explain.
All the written documents do show $40,000, and that
does create a problem so far as statute of frauds.

If the

sale price was really 80,000 and if both plaintiff and
defendant understood it was 80,000, then the Court can't
escape from the fact that they were conspiring to deceive the
lender bank.

And I've indicated —

I recognize Mr. Wahlquist

said that was not so, that "In real estate transactions, we
will try to do everything we can to sell a lot and to
accommodate people which takes all kinds of transactions,"
and I recognize it does.
But the bank was making a determination apparently
in this case that the maximum that they wanted on less than
one acre, at least this is the argument of Mr. Wahlquist, was

f
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1

$40,000.

2

from the view of Mr. Wahlquist, it would have been with what

3

And so if they had gone ahead with the transaction

I we in the law call unclean hands.

But it could only have

4

been done by both unclean hands on both parties in which both

5

would be appearing before the Court in essentially the same

6

position.

7

I think the plaintiff as I've said could have —

8

that was the agreement, the plaintiff could have sold the

9

front lot for 40,000, reserved the rear lot, the flag lot to

10

be later purchased by the defendant or to be sold to somebody

11

else for that $40,000.

12

if

Now, as to the value of the lots. We had some

13

testimony on that, some testimony that suggested that perhaps

14

Lot 34 —

15

18,000 because of its location, Lot 35 was worth 30,000,

16

Lot 36 was worth 30,000, that Lot 37 was a little more, and I

17

don't believe we ever got a price on that, although it was a

18

little more than the others.

19

usable as you go toward the north end of the lot.

20

No.

Lot —

I think it was Lot 36 that was worth

But much of its land was not

So what's the value of Lot 33?

I think the

21

evidence has clearly shown to the Court that the value of

22

Lot 33 was probably $80,000.

23

trade as we all know for the three —

24

showed three lots in what's been known as Lot 33, each of

25

those lots priced at $33,000.

as rr

CD

Originally there had been a
the original plot

There may be some question of

JSJ.

p..

i

whether they would have actually sold for 33#000 or whether

2

they would have sold for 30,000 or 28,000 or some other

3

figure.

4

$33,000.

But they were probably as an offering price worth

5

The entire development was not completed as to all

6

three lots, and so the value that would have —

or the amount

7

that would have been expended to make them three lots wasn't

8

entirely put into it.

9

that it may take the value from each of the two lots

One of the expert witnesses estimated

10

separately as 8,000 to $10,000. And if we take that $99,000

11

for the three lots and subtract the 8 to 10 from it, we're

12

right down to the $80,000 valuation.

13

value of the lot at the time when it was sold to the

14

defendant.

15

I think that was the

Now, of course, the Court has to ask the question:

16

Did the plaintiff actually sell the lot for 40,000?

Did they

17

attempt?

18

selling a $80,000 lot for $40,000?

19

trouble, and I suppose Mr. Wahlquist knew it at the time.

20

And this transaction took place in early November of 1986,

21

and he was leaving in December of 1986.

22

bankruptcy filed in February of 1987.

23

explanation.

24

needed capital right at the time for transactions, but they

25

weren't getting that much cash.

What reason in the Court's mind would they have for
They were in financial

There was a form of

So that's perhaps one

One can always surmise that perhaps the company

T

/>/> cr>

They were only getting

\t. P

£

20,000.

One can say that's quite a bit.

But for running of

a corporation with the number of full-time employees
apparently that Granada had at the time, that's not all that
significant.

It certainly —

The other 20,000 of the 40,000

was to be paid within a year's period of time and, in fact,
was paid in late July of 1987.
Now, part of the Court's approach to this case is I
recognize that the plaintiff has the burden of proof. And
that's very significant.

Plaintiff has, of course, the

burden of proof and preponderance of the evidence.

Defendant

hasn't come right out and said it, but said "When we're
dealing with the statute of fraud, we're dealing with the
clear and convincing degree of proof."
The Court has not been persuaded by a preponderance
of the evidence that the price was $80,000 with the two-step
payment method.
witness.

I found Mr. Wahlquist to be a credible

I found Daryl Hatch to be a credible witness. I

recognize their opinions are diametrically opposed.
myself the question:

Is one of them lying?

I ask

which is always

a possibility, and that still is a possibility.

If it is, I

don't know because they appeared to be honest.
What other answer is there?

And, of course,

counsel for the plaintiff cited one of those possibilities,
and that's that it's a mutual mistake of the parties. That
all this time the plaintiff was expecting a two-step method,

town
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and the defendant was saying, "Boy, I've got a real bargain
on this property.

They finally came down to 40,000 because

that's what they're going to sign all the contracts for."
And so he proceeds on it.
When I find that both of the parties have appeared
to be honest, when I say both parties, I'm talking about
Mr. Wahlquist and Mr. Hatch, it probably puts me in the
belief that we're probably talking about a mutual mistake
more than we are talking about a contract to pay the 80,000.
Then the Court has to look at the fact that Mr. Hatch on
reliance on that 40,000 from his point of view apparently
borrowed about $200,000 from his bank.

20,000 of that paid

the balance as per the contract.
It's been suggested to the Court that I might try
reformation of contract or unjust enrichment.
believe it's fraud.

I said I don't

I just don't see where any of these

solve the problem that the Court's faced with.

If there was

a mutual mistake of fact, one thinking it was 80,000, the
other thinking it was 40,000, the Court, had there not been a
house built on it, had there not been a $200,000 loan on it,
it might be easy for the Court to talk about a reformation of
the contract or a recision of the contract.
in those terms.

But I can't talk

And where all of the documents were drawn

for $40,000, I think what that does is put the burden on the
plaintiff.

J(ELLU
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x

And I guess I'm saying that burden has not been met

2

within the —

3

the plaintiff is not entitled to any of those remedies

4

they've asked the Court for. And so it's going to be a

5

judgment in effect for the defendant, and ask the defendant

6

to draw the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Any

7

questions?

8

with the findings that I've made here. And so

I borrowed a couple of these.

9

the Court's record.

10

They weren't part of

So if you'll come and get your

depositions back.

11

THE CLERK:

The originals were not in the office.

12

THE COURT:

Okay. We do not have the originals, all

13

right.

14

depositions that were made use of during trial.

15

The record can show that we do not have the two

Whenever you're going to use those at trial, the

16

originals of those documents should be supplied to the Court

17

by whoever it is that's the custodian of the originals.

18

That's it. Okay.

That's all.

Thank you.

19

MR. MAHLER:

20

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

21

(Whereupon, the court proceedings were concluded.)

22

I

Thank you, your Honor.
Thank you, your Honor.

*****

23
24
25

town

zn Court Reporter

9

1
2

I STATE OP UTAH

)
: ss.
I COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

3

I, KELLY BROWN HICKEN, C.S.R., R.P.R. and Notary Public

4

for the State of Utah, residing in Salt Lake County, certify:

5

That the proceedings were taken before me at the

6

time and place herein set forth;

7

That all proceedings had of record at the time of

8

the proceeding were recorded stenographically by me and

9

were thereafter transcribed into typewritten form by me,

10

and I hereby certify that the foregoing typewritten

11

transcript as typed by me is a full, true and correct

12

record of my stenographic notes so taken;

13

I further certify that I am neither counsel for

14

nor related to any party to said action nor in anywise

15

interested in the outcome thereof.

16

I

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name and
affixed my seal this^/

17

day of ^jAA^u^cUn^c^/'
•

19 * ^ .

^

18
19
20
21

KELLY B#OWN HICKEN, C.S.R., R.P.R.,
Notary Public. Notary Commission
Expires on May 5, 1992

|
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23
24
25
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Kent L. Christiansen of
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420 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-3762
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CLERK. 2ND C S I . COURT
DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EMBASSY GROUP,

INC.,

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OP PACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Civil No. 48277
T. DARYL and MAUREEN E.
HATCH,

Judge Douglas Cornaby

Defendants.
This matter came on regularly before the Court for a nonjury trial on December 12th and 13th, 1991, the Honorable
Douglas L. Cornaby, Second District Court Judge, presiding.
Kent L. Christiansen of the law firm of Christiansen & Sonntag,
appeared on behalf of the Defendants, T. Daryl Hatch and
Maureen Hatch (hereinafter "Hatchs"). Heinz Mahler of the law
firm of Kipp & Christian, appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff,
Embassy Group, Inc. (hereinafter "Embassy").

The parties

having adduced evidence by way of testimony and documentary
exhibits, and having argued the matter to the Court, and the
Court having

reviewed

the file, exhibits, and

memoranda

submitted by the parties, the Court being fully advised in the

premises, and good cause appearing therefore, the Court hereby
makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff, Embassy Group, Inc. is a Utah corporation,
the beneficiary of an assignment of interest in any claim that
Granada, Inc. and/or Shim Investments may have had against
Defendants for the purchase of Lot 33 of the Bridlewood
Subdivision, located in the City of Bountiful, Davis County,
State of Utah.
2.

Defendants T. Daryl Hatch and Maureen Hatch are

residents of Davis County, State of Utah.
3.

The dispute herein involves real property located in

Davis County and involves a controversy which is in excess of
$10,000.00.
4.

This court has jurisdiction to hear the matter.

5.

The Plaintiff's agents testified that they believed

very positively that Lot 3 3 of the Bridlewood Subdivision was
to have been sold to the Hatch's for $80,000.00.
6.

Defendant also testified very affirmatively that he

only agreed to pay $40,000.00 for Lot 33, and in fact that he
could only afford a building lot priced at $40,000.00 or less.
7.

All of the written documentation concerning the sale

of Lot 33 to the Defendants indicates that the purchase price
was $40,000.00.
8. The Court finds no distinction between the wording of
the first Earnest Money Agreement dated September 12, 1986,
2

which reads ,fa portion of Lot 33 Bridlewood Subdivision" for
$40,000.00, and the subsequent Earnest Money Agreement of the
same date which reads "a portion of Bridlewood Subdivision Lot
33" for $40,000.00.
9.

The Court is persuaded that there is no reason why

Plaintiff or its predecessor could not have divided Lot 33 by
utilizing a "flag lot."
10.

The Court further finds no reason why Lot 33 could

not have been divided into three lots, assuming the necessary
additional improvements were made and appropriate approvals
were obtained.
11. The Court also found Defendant Maureen Hatch to be a
credible and reliable witness, particularly when she testified
that it was her understanding that the cost of Lot 33 was
$40,000.00.
12. The Court finds that the evidence is not clear as to
why Maureen Hatch's signature is the only one which appears on
the Earnest Money Agreement.
13. The Court is convinced that if Defendant Daryl Hatch
believed he was buying Lot 33 for $80,000.00, he would not have
told his wife he was buying it for $40,000.00.
14.

The Earnest Money Agreement and all of the loan and

closing documents prepared by the Plaintiffs indicate that the
purchase price of Lot 33 was $40,000.00.
15.

The Court is convinced that if in fact both parties

had agreed that the purchase price of Lot 33 was to have been
3

$80,000.00, they would also had to have been involved in a
scheme to deceive the bank for the Hatchs1 the long term
financing.

If that were the case, the Plaintiff would be

before the Court with "unclean hands."
16.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff could have sold

the front portion of Lot 33 for $40,000.00 to the Hatchs, and
reserved ownership of the rear portion of Lot 33 for an
additional $40,000.00, but chose not to do so.
17. The evidence presented at trial indicates that Lot 33
likely had a value of $80,000.00 at the time of the sale to the
Hatchs; although, there is some question as to whether Lot 33
could have been divided into three lots which would have sold
for $33,000.00 each.
18.
Hatchs

The evidence supports the fact that at the time the
bought

incomplete.
between

Lot

33,

the

Bridlewood

Subdivision

was

The evidence indicates that it would have cost

$8,000-10,000

per

lot

to

make

the

necessary

improvements to divide Lot 33 into three separate lots.
19. The Court finds that Plaintiff's predecessor may have
been motivated to sell Lot 33 for $40,000.00 as a result of its
pending bankruptcy and financial difficulties.
20.

Plaintiff is required to meet the burden of proof,

which in this case is by "clear and convincing" evidence.
21. The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden
of proof.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the
4

following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That this court has jurisdiction to decide the

disputed claims between the parties.
2.

That the evidence adduced at trial does not support

the Plaintiff's claim for recovery under the theory of breach
of contract or reformation of the contract.
3.

That the evidence adduced at trial does not support

the Plaintiff's claim for recovery under the theory of fraud.
4.

That the evidence adduced at trial does not support

the Plaintiff's claim for recovery under the theory of mutual
mistake.
5.

That the evidence adduced at trial does not support

the Plaintiff's claim for recovery under the theory of lack of
consideration and unjust enrichment.
6. That the evidence adduced at trial requires that title
and ownership of Lot 33 Bridlewood Subdivision Amended be
quieted such that legal and equitable title vest solely to T.
Daryl and Maureen Hatch.

Plaintiff should be directed to

immediately cause that certain Notice of Interest filed at Book
1341 Page 951 of the official records of the Davis County
Recorder to be withdrawn.
7.

That judgment upon the merits should be entered in

favor of the Defendants, T. Daryl and Maureen Hatch; that the
claims of the Plaintiff, Embassy Group, Inc. should be

5

dismissed with prejudice; and that Plaintiff take nothing
therefrom.
DATED this JLf day of Dmjuuibgr, 1 9 ^ ,
BY THE COURT:

DougT&sh*£. Cornaby ^"
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
By:
Heinz Mahler
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by
placing a true and correct copy thereof in the U.S. Mails,
postage prepaid, this

day of December, 1991, and properly

addressed as follows:
Heinz J. Mahler
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
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OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE

Jul*

2 2SflT9Z

CLERK, 2NDDIST. CO'JR
COURT
BY.

HEINZ J. HAHLER - NO. 3832
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorney for plaintiff
Embassy Group, Inc.
City Centre I, Suite 330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
(801) 521-3773

DEPUTYCLERI

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS'
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

EMBASSY GROUP, INC.

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 48277

T. DARYL and MAUREEN E.
HATCH,

Judge Douglas Cornaby

Defendants.
Plaintiff Embassy Group, Inc. objects to the proposed Findings
of

Fact

submitted

by

defendants

and

respectfully

requests

modifications as follows:
1.

Paragraph 5 should state the following:
Mark Wahlquist and Grant Bangerter testified that they

agreed to sell Lot 33 for $80,000 in a two-step process,
$40,000 at closing and an additional $40,000 within two years
from the time that defendants completed building their new
home on Lot 33.

2.

Paragraph 7 should state the following:
All of the written documentation concerning the sale of

Lot 33 to the defendants indicated that the purchase price was
$40,000 for "a portion of Lot 33"•
3.

Paragraph 9 should state the following:
The court is persuaded that there is no reason why

plaintiff or its predecessor could not have divided Lot 33 by
utilizing a flag lot, but did not do so, because defendants
wanted to purchase the entire lot.
4.

Paragraph 10 should state the following:
The court finds that Lot 33 could have been divided into

three lots for which preliminary approval had already been
obtained, assuming the necessary improvements were made and
that final approval was obtained.
5.

As to paragraph 11, other than the finding that Maureen

Hatch was a credible witness, plaintiff objects to the balance of
the paragraph in that no such finding was made by the court and in
fact defendant Maureen Hatch testified that she had no recollection
concerning details of the purchase price.
6.

As to paragraph 13, plaintiff objects to the same for the

reason that there was no such finding by the court.

2

7.

Paragraph 14 should state the following:
The Earnest Money Agreements prepared by the plaintiff

indicate that the purchase price of "a portion of Lot 33" was
$40,000. All of the loan and closing documents also indicated
a purchase price of $40,000 but only referred to a street
address in connection with the property.
8.

Paragraph 15 should state the following:
If in fact an agreement was reached to purchase all of

Lot 33 for $80,000 in a two-step process as plaintiff's agents
testified

was proposed

by Daryl Hatch, the court could

construe that such an agreement could be a proposal to mislead
the bank providing Hatch's long term financing, since the bank
requested of Hatch, that Hatch obtain a building lot of less
than one acre in size.

If that were the case, then both

parties may have come before the court with "unclean hands".
9.

Paragraph 16 should state the following:
The court finds that the plaintiff could have sold the

front portion of Lot 33 for $40,000 to the Hatches and
reserved ownership of the rear portion of Lot 33 for an
additional $40,000, but at closing, Mark Wahlquist conveyed
title to "all of Lot 33" based on his belief that Hatch had
agreed to pay an additional $40,000 for said rear portion of
Lot 33 at a future date.
3

10.

Paragraph 17 should state the following:
The evidence presented at trial indicates that Lot 33 had

a value of approximately $80,000 at the time of the sale to
the Hatches,
11.

Paragraph 18 should state the following:
The evidence supports the fact that at the time the

Hatches

bought

incomplete.

Lot

33,

the

Bridlewood

Subdivision

was

The evidence indicates that it could have cost

between $8,000 to $10,000 per lot to make the necessary
improvements to divide Lot 33 into three separate lots, which
total amount for three lots is not significantly different
from developing Lot 33 as one lot.
12.

As to paragraph 19, plaintiff objects to this finding for

the reason that there was no such finding by the court.
13.

Paragraph 21 should state the following:
The court finds that the plaintiff has not met its burden

of proof that defendants committed fraud, that plaintiff is
entitled to recision of the contract, that plaintiff is
entitled to reformation of the contract to enforce the oral
agreement or that plaintiff is otherwise entitled to enforce
the oral contractual agreement at issue.

The plaintiff has

met its burden of proof that there was a mutual mistake of,
by,

and

between

the

parties
4

concerning

the

terms

and

conditions of the sale of "all of Lot 33" [It should also be
noted that the court made no finding concerning the unjust
enrichment claim.].

Plaintiff objects to defendants' proposed Conclusions of Law
as follows:
1.

Plaintiff objects to paragraph 4 for the reason that the

court did find that the parties were mutually mistaken as to the
terms and conditions of the sale of "all of Lot 33".
2.

As to paragraph 5, plaintiff objects in that the court

made no finding of any kind concerning plaintiff's theory of
recovery on the basis of unjust enrichment.
3.

Plaintiff objects to paragraph 6 and 7 in that, based on

the Findings of Fact by the court, there was a finding of mutual
mistake by the parties as to the terms and conditions of the sale
for "all of Lot 33", although it appears that at the time that the
court ruled from the bench, no remedy was provided for the mutual
mistake of the parties.

It is plaintiff's contention that the

court should provide a remedy consistent with the court's Findings
of Fact, specifically that the contract for sale only referred to
"a portion of Lot 33" and that title to "all of Lot 33" was
transferred only due to the mistaken belief that an additional
$40,000 payment would be forthcoming.

5

Accordingly, paragraph 6 and 7 of the Conclusions of Law
should be amended to reflect that the title and ownership interest
of defendants should equitably be only in ,fa portion of Lot 33" and
that title to the rear portion of Lot 33 should re-vest in
plaintiff.
DATED this

£D^ day of January, 1992.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

iler
)r plaintiff
Jroup, Inc.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
MAILED, postage prepaid, this o23nl_day of January, 1992, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to Defendants'
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the following:
Kent L. Christiansen
MUELLER & CHRISTIANSEN
300 IBM Plaza
420 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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JUDGMENT

Kent L. Christiansen of
CHRISTIANSEN & SONNTAG
300 IBM Plaza
420 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone:
(801) 359-3762
Attorneys for Defendants
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DEPUTY CLERif

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EMBASSY GROUP, INC.,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 48277
T. DARYL and MAUREEN E.
HATCH,

Judge Douglas Cornaby

Defendants.

This matter came on regularly before the Court for a nonjury

trial

on

December

Douglas L. Cornaby,

12th

and

13th,

Second District

1991,

Court

the

Judge,

Honorable
presiding.

Kent L. Christiansen of the law firm of Christiansen & Sonntag,
appeared

on

behalf

of

the

Defendants,

Maureen Hatch (hereinafter "Hatchs") .

T.

Daryl

Hatch

and

Heinz Mahler of the law

firm of Kipp & Christian, appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff,
Embassy

Group,

having adduced

Inc.

(hereinafter

"Embassy").

evidence by way of testimony

The
and

parties

documentary

exhibits, and having argued the matter to the Court, and the
Court

having

reviewed

the

file,

exhibits,

and

memoranda

submitted by the parties, the Court having entered its Findings
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of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court being fully advised
in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore, it is
hereby:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment upon the
merits be entered in favor of the Defendants, T. Daryl and
Maureen Hatch; that the claims of the Plaintiff, Embassy Group,
Inc. are hereby dismissed with prejudice; and that Plaintiffs
shall take nothing therefrom.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that title and ownership of Lot 33
Amended Bridlewood Subdivision, is hereby quieted such that
legal and equitable title shall vest solely to T. Daryl and
Maureen Hatch. Plaintiff is directed to immediately cause that
certain Notice of Interest filed at Book 1341 Page 951 of the
official records of the Davis County Recorder to be withdrawn.
DATED this #-f

day of Dei Hwfaer, 19^T.
BY THE COURT:

^^^ougla^lj^? Cornaby
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
By:

Heinz Mahler
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Judgment by placing a true and correct copy
thereof in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid, this

day of

December, 1991, and properly addressed as follows:
Heinz J. Mahler
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
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